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Invalid party wall awards and how to avoid them 
Considers the reasons for the invalidity of party wall awards. Examines decided cases under 
earlier party wall legislation in the context of the Party Wall etc Act 1996. Explains invalidity 
on the basis of an excess of the surveyors' statutory authority. Defines this authority in terms 
of jurisdiction and power. Demonstrates the limits of the surveyors' authority and emphasises 
the importance of strict compliance with statutory procedures. Concludes that surveyors 
should adopt an inquisitive and analytical approach to the scope of their authority to avoid the 
possibility of invalid awards. Echoes John Anstey's earlier warning that surveyors should 
avoid a broad-brush approach to their duties which will only leave them "covered in soot". 
Abstract 
 
party wall, surveyor, award, ultra vires, power, jurisdiction 
Keywords 
 
Introduction 
The Party Wall etc Act 1996 is intended to facilitate certain categories of construction 
operations in the vicinity of property boundaries. It achieves this by enabling the most 
appropriate construction solutions to be employed on affected structures irrespective of their 
location in relation to the boundary or to any common law rights affecting them. 
 
Building owners are given a statutory right to undertake construction work at the boundary 
and this replaces any previous common law right to do so.1 The adjoining owner's common 
law rights in tort are also replaced by a statutory right not to be subjected to unnecessary 
inconvenience by the building owner's works.2
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Where the Act applies, construction solutions which meet the building owner's needs whilst 
minimising inconvenience to the adjoining owner can be negotiated between the parties3. 
More usually, through the machinery provided by the statute, surveyors will be appointed by 
the parties who negotiate these solutions on their behalf. The surveyors' decision will then be 
embodied in a statutory award which, unless appealed, becomes binding on the parties.4
 
 
The surveyors' involvement is therefore central to achieving the purposes of the legislation 
and is widely credited with avoiding disputes between neighbouring owners that might 
otherwise result in litigation.  
 
The essence of this involvement is said to involve the application of practical common sense 
rather than legal principles5 and surveyors tend to adopt a helpful and pragmatic approach to 
the resolution of potential conflicts between neighbouring owners. This approach was also 
typical of the earlier London legislation6 upon which the Act is modelled and, writing in 
1961, Leach7
 
, perhaps unwittingly, provided an insight into its potential dangers as well as its 
undoubted advantages: 
"On the whole these provisions have worked well, not because of their drafting, 
which is riddled with doubts, but because their operation has been left so much to 
surveyors who have not been too analytical or too inquisitive as to the exact scope of 
their powers thereunder." 
 
The risk to surveyors who fail to be sufficiently analytical or inquisitive as to the scope of 
their powers is that they might inadvertently exceed these powers with potentially serious 
consequences for themselves and their appointing owners.  
 
An award which falls outside the powers laid down in the Act will be invalid and will provide 
no protection for either of the parties to the award. An invalid award may therefore result in 
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litigation between the parties and a possible liability in negligence by the surveyors to each of 
the appointing parties. 
 
John Anstey8
 
 warned of these dangers in this journal in 1996 when he cautioned that: 
"Case after case in modern times has turned on precise interpretation of words, or on 
legality of procedures - never on the actual works or the manner of carrying them 
out......It follows therefore that the broad brush approach is utterly unsafe." 
 
This paper echoes this warning and seeks to provide guidance on the avoidance of invalid 
awards. It examines the basis of the surveyors' authority under the legislation and the 
prerequisites for the validity of their awards. It considers examples of invalid awards from 
reported cases under the London party wall legislation and attempts to draw conclusions for 
surveyors who accept appointments under the present Act.  
 
Basis of Surveyors' Authority 
Appointed surveyors are not agents for their appointing owners and therefore have no 
contractual authority to bind those who appoint them. Neither do they have any contractual 
right to determine disputes between the parties in the manner of an arbitrator or independent 
expert. Their authority to impose solutions on the parties by award is derived solely from the 
statute and a failure to comply with its requirements may therefore jeopardise that authority. 
 
Whilst in some circumstances it is possible that minor departures from the legislative 
provisions will be tolerated by the courts9, surveyors would be unwise to rely on this. Indeed, 
because the Act invests surveyors with far-reaching powers to interfere with the property 
rights of adjoining owners the court in Gyle-Thompson v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd 10 took 
the view that they were subject to a corresponding duty to comply strictly with all aspects of 
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the legislation. Brightman J's oft-cited dicta in that case reinforce the importance of John 
Anstey's warning about the dangers of the broad brush approach11
 
: 
"Those surveyors are in a quasi-judicial position with statutory powers and 
responsibilities. It therefore seems to me important that the steps laid down by the Act 
should be scrupulously followed throughout, and short cuts are not desirable. 
 
.....Having regard to the functions of surveyors.......and their power to impose 
solutions of building problems on non-assenting parties, the procedural requirements 
of the Act are important and the approach of surveyors to those requirements ought 
not to be casual." 
 
It is helpful to understand that the surveyors' overall authority is founded on the twin concepts 
of jurisdiction and power. Surveyors who lack jurisdiction will have no authority to make an 
award and any attempt to do so will therefore be ineffective. If surveyors possess the 
necessary jurisdiction then their awards may still be invalid to the extent that they purport to 
exercise powers that have not been bestowed on them by the statute. 
 
The importance of these two overlapping concepts of jurisdiction and power to the validity of 
surveyors' awards is considered in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Nature of Surveyors' Jurisdiction 
The appointed surveyors collectively constitute what has been referred to as a "practical 
tribunal".12
 
 Although concerned with practical matters rather than with matters of law this 
description reflects their role in adjudicating between the parties and in imposing decisions 
upon them.  
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As with any tribunal, the jurisdiction of this tribunal is dependent on it having been properly 
constituted and is also limited to those matters over which it is competent to adjudicate upon. 
 
To the extent that one of these essential requirements is not satisfied the tribunal will lack the 
jurisdiction to make a valid award. Let us therefore examine each of these in turn. 
 
Proper Constitution of Tribunal 
Composition of Tribunal 
The tribunal must either consist of a single "agreed surveyor" or of two party-appointed 
surveyors and a "third surveyor".13  Although neither of the parties can be appointed as their 
own surveyor there are no other statutory restrictions on who may act.14
 
 As separate legal 
personalities the appointment by a company of one of its directors or employees would not 
therefore seem to invalidate an award. 
Appointment of Surveyors 
Whatever the particular composition of the tribunal, it will be improperly constituted unless 
all relevant appointments, and the selection of any third surveyor, are in writing.15 To be valid 
the written appointment must clearly relate to the particular dispute under the Act upon which 
the surveyors are required to adjudicate.16
 
 
A course of dealings, involving a telephone conversation later confirmed by letter, has been 
held to satisfy the statutory requirements although this was on the basis of the particular 
surrounding circumstances appertaining at the time.17 Surveyors will rarely be so fortunate as 
was demonstrated by the decision in the Gyle-Thompson case, referred to above. In that case a 
retrospective written confirmation of an earlier informal appointment was held to be 
insufficient in respect of an award based on a second notice which was subsequently served 
under the Act.  
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The lessons for surveyors are that written appointments should be contained in a single formal 
document in terms which leave no doubt about their intended purpose and scope. One of the 
published forms of words should be used18
 
 and no action taken by the appointed surveyor 
until the document has been signed and returned by the appointing owner.  
Unfortunately even this will not guarantee the proper constitution of the tribunal if there is 
some defect in the appointment of the other surveyor or in the selection of the third surveyor. 
Cox & Hamilton19 provide a simple but effective method for ensuring the validity of the third 
surveyor's selection in the RIBA Guidance Note and Brightman J's advice for confirming the 
validity of other appointments should now be familiar practice for most surveyors20
 
: 
"It would be a wise precaution for the surveyor of the building owner and the 
surveyor of the adjoining owner to inspect each other's written appointment before 
they perform their statutory functions. Neither of them has power to concur in an 
award unless both of them have been duly appointed. 
 
......It would be a wise precaution for the third surveyor, on accepting office, to 
inspect the written appointments of those selecting him; unless they have been duly 
appointed, they have no power to select a third surveyor; if the third surveyor has not 
been validly selected in writing, he has no power to concur in an award." 
 
Existence of Dispute 
The existence of a dispute within the terms of the Act forms an essential prerequisite for the 
appointment of surveyors and for the proper constitution of the tribunal.21 In most situations 
this will be through the device of a "deemed dispute" which arises automatically where a 
building owner's originating notice is not consented to within 14 days.22 Where there is some 
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impediment to the validity of the notice, all subsequent steps in the statutory procedure, 
including the surveyors' award may therefore also be rendered invalid. 
 
Validity of Notices 
The validity of originating notices depends on their containing the requisite information and 
on being validly served. They do not have to be in any prescribed form although mistakes are 
more easily avoided if they are drafted according to one of the published precedents.23
 
 
The information to be included within the notice is set out in the statute24 and sufficient detail 
must be included to enable the recipient to decide on an appropriate response to it.25 In certain 
situations drawings must also be attached.26 Whilst there is no requirement that notices be 
dated or even signed the omission of these details may lead to problems of evidence that 
could potentially invalidate the notice.27
 
 
Notices must be served by the building owner, as defined by the Act, upon all persons falling 
within the Act's definition of adjoining owner, although it is only necessary to serve a notice 
on one of two or more joint owners of a single interest in land.28 Where work is to be 
undertaken to a property in joint ownership all joint owners must however join in the notice as 
building owner.29 A notice served by an intending developer who has not yet acquired the 
necessary qualification of ownership will be invalid.30
 
 
The Act specifies a number of methods for service of notices31 although service is not 
restricted to these methods. In particular, service can be effected on a surveyor or other agent 
having authority to accept service on behalf of an adjoining owner.32 Where no such authority 
exists service will be invalid unless it is effected directly on the adjoining owner.33  Service 
may also, of course, be effected on behalf of a building owner providing that specific 
authority has been given for this.34
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Competence of Tribunal 
Statutory Requirement 
The surveyors' tribunal is only competent to make awards on matters which are in dispute 
between the parties and which are also connected with work to which the Act relates.35
 
  
Nature of Dispute 
If the parties have a difference of opinion about a matter then this is sufficient to constitute a 
dispute.36 The word "difference" was used in the earlier London statutes instead of "dispute" 
but there is thought to be no practical distinction between the two terms.37 In Selby v 
Whitbread & Co38
  
  McCardie J was of the view that the term should not be too strictly 
defined in the context of the party wall legislation: 
"I do not think it would be in conformity with the scheme of the Act......to give too 
rigid or confined a meaning to the word "difference" as used in such Act.  Moreover, 
a difference is none the less a "difference" because the divergence of view as to law 
or fact has been indicated by phrases of courtesy rather than the language of 
vehemence." 
 
In fact, the term has an even broader meaning within the Act as the surveyors are clearly 
competent to adjudicate on deemed disputes which arise under the legislation (see above) in 
addition to any actual differences of opinion between the parties. In these situations the 
simple absence of a written consent between the parties will be a sufficient basis for the 
surveyors' jurisdiction. Once this jurisdiction has arisen the surveyors are competent to 
resolve the various issues that may arise throughout the continuance of the works and may 
make any number of successive awards without the requirement that further disputes should 
have first arisen between the parties.39 
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Connection with work to which the Act relates 
Whilst a surveyors' award will rarely founder on the absence of a dispute it may still do so if 
the matters addressed do not have the necessary degree of connection with work to which the 
Act relates. 
 
An award will therefore be ineffective to the extent that it addresses works which are not 
regulated by the Act and may be invalid on account of this. Piling work falling outside the 3 
or 6 metre limits within the Act, the regulation of the general conduct of development work 
on site and agreements affecting easements and crane oversailing are all matters which fall 
outside the Act and which therefore have no place in the surveyors' award.  
 
Once appointed, surveyors may indeed be called upon to resolve a variety of disputes between 
the parties but they must be careful to distinguish between those that must be settled by 
consensual negotiation and those upon which they have power to adjudicate under the Act. 
Slesser LJ emphasised this distinction in Burlington Property Company Ltd v Odeon Theatres 
Ltd40
 
: 
"It seems to me entirely contrary to all recognised principles that arbitrators, not 
having differences at large submitted to them, but limited powers under a statute, can 
under pretext of the differences submitted to them adjudicate upon matters upon 
which the statute gives them no power to adjudicate." 
 
Even where the award addresses works which are regulated by the Act it will still be invalid if 
these works do not form the subject-matter of the dispute actually submitted to the surveyors 
for adjudication. Unless this submission arises out of works which an adjoining owner has 
consented to41 this means that the works being addressed by surveyors must have been 
referred to in the originating notice.42 This was emphasised by Collins MR in Leadbetter v 
Marylebone Corporation43:  
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"[The section] is expressly and in terms limited to matters referred to in the notice; it 
does not give the surveyors general jurisdiction over every dispute 'in respect of any 
matter arising with reference to any work to which any notice given under this part of 
the Act relates'; it cannot oust the fresh jurisdiction of a fresh surveyor......"  
 
In that case an award was held to be invalid where it attempted to regulate future matters in 
respect of which no dispute had yet arisen. A similar decision was reached in the more recent 
case of Woodhouse v Consolidated Property Corporation Ltd44
 
 where an award purported to 
resolve a dispute about the collapse of a party wall. Here, the dispute was held to be outside 
the tribunal's competence because it pre-dated the appointment of surveyors and could not 
therefore have been one of the matters submitted to them under the Act. 
Surveyors' Statutory Powers 
Where the surveyors have jurisdiction under the Act they are invested with the power to make 
binding awards which may determine any of the following issues45
 
: 
(a) the right to execute work under the Act 
 
(b) the time and manner of executing any such work; and 
 
(c) any other matter arising out of or incidental to the dispute referred to them 
including the costs of making the award. 
 
An award which purports to determine some other issue or which determines one of these 
issues in a manner which was not anticipated by the legislation will have exceeded the 
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statutory powers and will be invalid. The extent of the surveyors' powers in respect of each of 
these three issues will now be explored. 
 
The Right to Execute Work under the Act 
Limited scope of surveyors' powers 
It will always be a question of fact as to whether the particular works proposed by a building 
owner fall within one of the categories of work authorised by the statute. The surveyors' 
powers to determine the right to execute work under the Act must therefore be read in this 
context as they clearly have no power to confer or abrogate rights in general.46
 
 
In Gyle-Thompson47
 
, Brightman J emphasised the limited nature of the surveyors' powers in 
this context: 
"If it is asked what 'right' is within the contemplation of [the Act] as appropriate to be 
determined by an award, an example applicable to section 46(1)(a)48
 
 would be the 
determination by the surveyors of the 'necessity' of the intended work on account of 
want of repair; in the absence of such necessity the 'right' under that paragraph (for 
example) to underpin would not exist. In fact many of the 'rights' conferred by section 
46(1) are conditional rights which are only exercisable on proof of some fact 
appropriate to be determined by the surveyors in their award. That, in my judgement, 
is the context in which [the Act] enacts that the award may determine the 'right' to 
execute works." 
Declaratory role 
Whilst this might accurately describe the limits of the surveyors' power to impose decisions 
on the parties, few awards are so restricted. Such an interpretation ignores the parties' 
expectations, and common practice, that awards should also be seen to provide a more general 
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authorisation for works under the Act. Although such practices may simply be declaratory of 
existing statutory rights they serve a useful purpose in setting out the nature of the permitted 
works and so in enabling the parties to understand the practical implications of the bare legal 
rights referred to in the statute.  
 
Before endorsing works in this way the surveyors will however wish to ensure that they are 
authorised by the legislation and that the award is not therefore ultra vires. This will often 
involve them in making decisions concerning the interpretation of the statute in addition to 
those relating simply to the nature of the work. 
 
Interpretation of statutory rights 
In addressing the likely scope of the various rights granted by the Act the approach of the 
courts to similar questions in the past can be instructive. In particular, there is a general 
presumption of statutory interpretation that, in the absence of clear wording in a statute, 
Parliament does not intend to expropriate private property rights without providing full 
compensation49
 
.  
On this basis an award which purported to allow a building owner to knock archways in a 
party wall has been held to be ultra vires50 and in another case the construction of a lining 
wall on the adjoining owner's side of a party wall was also held to be outside the powers 
contained in the Act.51
 
 For the same reason the court in Gyle-Thompson held that the 1939 
Act contained no right to reduce the height of a party wall or party fence wall.  
These cases can be contrasted with a more liberal approach to interpretation in situations 
where the right claimed involves no expropriation of property. For example, in Standard Bank 
of British South America v Stokes52 the court decided that a right in the 1855 Act to raise a 
party wall also included a right to underpin, although no such express right was contained in 
the statute. 
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The Time and Manner of Executing Work 
Significance 
The surveyors' power to determine the time and manner of executing the works is 
fundamental to achieving the goals of the legislation. By regulating the conduct of the works 
they achieve an equitable balance between the rights of the building owner to undertake the 
works and those of adjoining owners to be free from damage or unnecessary inconvenience 
which might result from them. 
 
Time for execution of work 
In practice, the surveyors' power to determine the time for executing the work is subject to a 
number of restrictions. Unless agreed by the parties to the contrary the work cannot 
commence until the Act's minimum notice period has expired following service of the 
originating notice.53  After commencement the surveyors' do have the power to restrict 
working hours during the day but probably only in the case of excessively noisy work.54
 
  
The requirement to balance the competing interests of the parties means that some level of 
inconvenience during the working day must ordinarily be endured by an adjoining owner. In 
the case of excessively noisy work even this will not automatically amount to an actionable 
nuisance at common law unless the perpetrators have failed to take reasonable steps to 
minimise its impact.55  These steps might include some restriction on the frequency and 
duration of the offending works and, as the Act displaces common law rights in this context56, 
it is for the surveyors to impose appropriate restrictions in their award. On this basis it is 
submitted that restrictions imposed by the surveyors will be ultra vires to the extent that they 
exceed those required by the common law. 
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Manner of executing work 
The surveyors' extensive powers to regulate the manner of executing the work were described 
by Leach57
 
 in the following terms: 
"The surveyors are concerned with workmanship, the materials, and the method of 
execution of the works to be carried out to the structure....[and].....for the protection 
of the adjoining premises from injury......" 
 
Although the exercise of these powers is, once again, subject to the requirement to balance the 
competing interests of the two parties, in practice the surveyors are given a wide discretion to 
make construction-related decisions which will rarely be challenged by the courts. 
 
In Barry v Minturn58
works would cause to the adjoining owner they held that the award should stand.  
 an award required a particular repair solution to be undertaken to a party 
wall, partly on the basis of the wall's past history. Whilst the House of Lords was satisfied that 
this was an improper basis for a decision they were unwilling to overturn the award. Because 
there was evidence that the tribunal making the award had also, as required by the statute, 
considered the level of inconvenience that the  
 
The courts have also been unwilling to overturn awards which have arguably interfered with 
the substantive rights between the parties whilst purporting simply to regulate the manner of 
executing the works. The decision, in Standard Bank of British South America v Stokes (see 
above), to allow a party wall to be underpinned in the absence of a statutory right to do so 
provides an early example of this.  
 
A similar decision was reached in Selby v Whitbread & Co59 where a party wall was left 
exposed and unsupported following the demolition of the building owner's adjoining building. 
The building owner had an unfettered right to demolish his building at common law and any 
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entitlement to support for the adjoining owner's building might have been expected to depend 
on the existence of an appropriate easement. Nevertheless, presumably on the basis of 
practical expediency, the court upheld an award which required the erection of a brick pier to 
support the party wall.  
 
The Court of Appeal went even further in Marchant v Capital & Counties plc60 where they 
upheld an award which imposed an obligation to provide weather protection to an exposed 
(non party) wall, despite the decision in Phipps v Pears61
 
 that no such right could exist at 
common law. This decision is also remarkable as it supports the rights of surveyors to impose 
continuing obligations on the parties rather than restricting the exercise of their powers to 
matters arising during the continuance of the works. This seems to be at variance with the 
spirit of the legislation and with the decision (referred to above) in Leadbetter v Marylebone 
Corporation. 
Other matters arising out of or incidental to the dispute 
Powers limited by existing jurisdiction 
The surveyors also have the power to determine any other matter that may arise out the 
dispute which has been referred to them or which is in some way incidental to it.62
 
  
Although phrased in very broad terms it should be emphasised that these words relate to the 
powers enjoyed by the surveyors and cannot be used as a pretext for extending their 
jurisdiction. As previously discussed they are generally only competent to adjudicate in 
relation to works described in an originating notice and the reference to matters which are 
incidental to the dispute has to be understood in this context. 
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Exercise of the powers 
In practice, the various ancillary matters to be adjudicated under this head often relate to the 
responsibility for payment of surveyors' fees, the liability for the costs of the work and to 
obligations by the building owner to compensate adjoining owners or to make good damage 
to their property.  
 
Although the building owner will normally be required to pay the surveyors' fees the 
surveyors do have a discretion in this regard63 and would be entitled to depart from this 
practice if they considered it appropriate.  They have less discretion in the context of the other 
matters. The Act determines the substantive liability for the costs of the works64 as well as the 
situations in which compensation and making good are appropriate.65 The surveyors' powers 
are therefore limited to the implementation of the statutory rules and they have no general 
discretionary power, for example, to award compensation.66
 
 
Power to rule on jurisdiction? 
There is some doubt as to whether surveyors may also adjudicate on questions relating to their 
own jurisdiction under this head. Surveyors are invariably required to make a number of 
decisions in the early stages of their appointment which relate to their competence to 
adjudicate or even on the extent to which their tribunal has been properly constituted. This 
may often involve questions about whether a particular structure is a party wall and about 
related questions concerning the position of a legal boundary line. Decisions may also have to 
be made about the validity of notices or of letters of appointment. 
 
It is submitted that the surveyors cannot avoid these decisions on the basis that they have no 
power to decide them. If every doubtful boundary line and every challenge to the surveyors' 
jurisdiction by an obstructive adjoining owner had to be decided by the courts then the 
legislation would be failing in its purpose. The court appears to have taken a similarly 
pragmatic view in the recent case of Loost v Kremer67 where the third surveyor had ruled that 
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both the party structure notice and the building owner's appointment of his surveyor were 
valid. The court upheld both rulings as explained by His Honour Judge Cowell: 
 
"It seems to me that an arbitrator, a third surveyor, does have the jurisdiction to 
decide a matter, even if it is a matter of law, which is fundamental to the question of 
whether he makes an award or not. It is possible for an arbitrator to say: 'This is a 
matter of law, it ought to be decided by a court first, then bring it back to me', but I 
can see nothing wrong in the arbitrator saying: 'I must decide this point because it is 
fundamental. I will decide it and I will say what my award would be on one basis or 
another', and then leave it to the party aggrieved to appeal to determine the point of 
law." 
 
The judge's remarks conceal a distinction between the surveyors having jurisdiction to make a 
final and binding decision on the matter and their simply making a pragmatic decision to 
enable the matter to proceed. In the former case, subject to a 14-day appeal period, their 
decision would be conclusive and could not be challenged by the courts. In the latter case they 
would be acting outside their authority and their decision would be subject to appeal at any 
time on the basis of its invalidity. 
 
It is submitted that the latter scenario is the more realistic. Whilst the courts have readily 
endorsed awards by surveyors dealing with construction-related issues they have jealously 
guarded their own power to determine questions concerning the surveyors' jurisdiction. In 
Crofts v Haldane68, for example, the court rejected the submission that the surveyors were the 
proper tribunal to determine whether the right to raise a party wall could authorise an 
interference with an easement of light. On the same basis, in Sims v The Estates Company69
 
 
the court held that the surveyors had no authority to determine whether a wall was a party 
wall and that this was a matter for the courts. 
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This suggests that, despite the widespread practice by surveyors in deciding questions 
concerning their own jurisdiction, they probably have no authority to do so under the Act. For 
the reasons outlined above, the successful operation of the legislation demands that surveyors 
continue to make these decisions upon acceptance of their appointment. They should be aware 
however that these decisions are taken as a prelude to their appointment to enable them to 
advise on its validity. As they fall outside the scope of the surveyors' statutory authority they 
should not therefore, despite current practice, be included within the body of an award. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has considered the various circumstances that might lead to the invalidity of 
surveyors' awards under the Party Wall etc Act 1996. The surveyors' authority is derived 
solely from the statute and, to the extent that an award exceeds this authority, it may be 
invalid. 
 
This authority has been shown to consist of the related concepts of jurisdiction and power. 
Whilst the surveyors' jurisdiction determines whether they may address a particular issue, the 
extent of their power determines the way in which they may do so. 
 
It has been argued that surveyors' awards will rarely be challenged by the courts to the extent 
that they confine themselves to regulating the time and manner of executing work under the 
Act. However, despite the apparent breadth of the words in the statute, the extent of the 
surveyors' powers is otherwise extremely limited. Their apparent power to determine the right 
to execute work under the Act has, for example, been demonstrated to be severely restricted 
and, despite recent suggestions to the contrary, it has been argued that they have no power to 
rule on their own jurisdiction. 
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The surveyors' jurisdiction has been shown to depend on the proper constitution of their 
tribunal and to be restricted to matters within their competence. Because this jurisdiction 
entitles surveyors to adjudicate on matters affecting private property rights the courts will 
usually demand a strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Tribunals have therefore 
been held to be improperly constituted because of deficiencies in originating notices and in 
surveyors' letters of appointment. The courts have also been unwilling to extend surveyors' 
jurisdiction to matters other than those referred to in the originating notice. 
 
Whilst the surveyors' authority is strictly defined by legal rules, the nature of their role is quite 
the opposite. As already noted, their task is concerned with the application of practical 
common sense rather than with legal principles and, for this reason, they have sometimes 
been described as constituting a 'practical tribunal'. The difficulty for surveyors lies in 
restricting their pragmatic and common sense decisions to the narrow confines of their 
statutory authority. 
 
This difficulty can be mitigated by developing an awareness of the problem and, contrary to 
the practice described by Leach70
 
 in the introduction to this paper, in adopting an inquisitive 
and analytical approach to the scope of the surveyor's authority. This must inevitably require a 
closer attention to the detail of the Act's procedures than has sometimes been the practice.  
This paper has attempted to echo John Anstey's graphic warning in this regard that "the broad 
sweep will leave you covered in soot". It is therefore perhaps appropriate to leave the final 
words to him71
 
: 
"The lesson is sad, but clear. Eschew the broad sweep and cling to the fine camel 
brush of the miniaturist....it is your professional duty, and it should be your pride, to 
get it perfect every time." 
 
Paul Chynoweth 
 20 
References 
                                                          
1   Standard Bank of British South America v Stokes [1878] 9 Ch 68 
 
2   Chynoweth, P. (2000)  'Unnecessary Inconvenience and Compensation within the Party Wall 
Legislation',  Structural Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. [insert page numbers once published] 
  
3   Party Wall etc Act 1996, ss. 3(3)(a) & 7(5)(b) 
 
4   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(16) 
 
5   Hampton, P. (1999) Party Structures: The Party Wall etc Act 1996, Architecture & Surveying 
Institute, p. 2.1 
 
6   Metropolitan Building Act 1855 Part III;  London Building Act 1894 Part VIII;  London Building 
Act 1930 Part IX;  London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 Part VI 
 
7   Leach, W. A. (1961) Party Structure Rights in London, Estates Gazette, p. 9 
 
8   Anstey, J. (1996) 'The broad sweep will leave you covered in soot',  Structural Survey, Vol. 14, No. 
1, pp. 49 - 50 
 
9   See, for example, Whitefleet Properties Ltd v St Pancras Building Society [1956] 167 EG 262 
 
10   [1974] 1 All ER 295 
 
11   Gyle-Thompson and others v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 295, at p. 304 
 
12   Fletcher Moulton L J in Adams v Marylebone Borough Council [1907] 2 KB 822, at p. 840 
 
13   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(1) 
 
14   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 20 
 
15   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(2) 
 
16   Brightman J in Gyle-Thompson and others v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 295, at p. 
303 
 
17   Whitefleet Properties Ltd v St Pancras Building Society [1956] 167 EG 262 
 
18   See Cox, S. & Hamilton, A. (1997) Architect's Guide to Job Administration: The Party Wall etc Act 
1996, RIBA Publications, p. 16, Morrow, N. S. (1998) Party Walls Workbook, RIBA Publications, p.26 
and  RICS (1997) Party Wall Legislation  and Procedure: A Guidance Note, RICS Books, p.38 
 
19   ibid, p. 53 
 
20   Brightman J in Gyle-Thompson and others v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 295, at p. 
304 
 
21   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(1) 
 
22   Party Wall etc Act 1996, ss. 5 & 6(7) 
 
23   See note 17 above. A comprehensive library of precedents also appears in Bickford-Smith, S. & 
Sydenham, C. (1997) Party Walls: The New Law, Jordans, Appendix 4 
 
24   Party Wall etc Act 1996, ss. 1(2), 1(5), 3(1) & 6(5) 
 
Paul Chynoweth 
 21 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
25   Hobbs, Hart & Co v Grover [1899] 1 Ch 11  
 
26   Party Wall etc Act 1996, ss. 3(1)(b) & 6(6) 
 
27   Bennett v Howell [1981] reported in Anstey, J. (1996) op cit, p. 49 and Anstey, J. & Vegoda, V. H. 
(1997) An Introduction to the Party Wall etc Act 1996, Lark Productions, p.73 
 
28   Crosby v Alhambra Co Ltd [1906] 1 Ch 295 
 
29   Lehman v Herman [1992] 1 EGLR 172 
 
30   Spiers & Son Ltd v Troup [1915] 84 LJKB 1986 
 
31   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 15 
 
32   Whitefleet Properties Ltd v St Pancras Building Society [1956] 167 EG 262 
 
33  Gyle-Thompson and others v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 295 
 
34   See RICS (1997) Party Wall Legislation  and Procedure: A Guidance Note, RICS Books, p.38 for 
an appropriate form of authority 
 
35   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(10) 
 
36   Mustill, M. J. & Boyd, S. C. (1989) The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England, 
Butterworths, p. 127 
 
37   ibid, p. 129 
 
38   [ 1917] 1 KB 736 at p. 745 
 
39   Selby v Whitbread & Co [ 1917] 1 KB 736 
 
40   [1939] 1 KB 633 at p. 642 
 
41   This obviates the requirement for service of an originating notice under the Party Wall etc Act 
1996, s. 3(3)(a) 
 
42   The changed wording in the 1996 Act which refers to matters connected with work to which the Act 
relates rather than the express references, in earlier legislation, to matters referred to in the notice is 
thought by many party wall practitioners to make no difference to this. See also Bickford Smith & 
Sydenham, Party Walls: The New Law, Jordans 1997, p. 50, footnote 13 
 
43   [1904] 2 KB 893 at p. 900 
 
44   [1993] 1 EGLR 174 
 
45   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(12) 
 
46   Leach, W. A., op cit,  p. 45 
  
47   Gyle-Thompson and others v Wall Street (Properties) Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 295 at p. 302 
 
48   Broadly equivalent to Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 2(2)(b) although the reference to the right to 
underpin now appears in s. 2(2)(a) 
 
49   Central London Board (Liquor Traffic) v Cannon Brewery Co Ltd [1919] AC 744 
 
Paul Chynoweth 
 22 
                                                                                                                                                                      
50   Burlington Property Company Ltd v Odean Theatres Ltd [1939] 1 KB 633 
 
51   Barry v Minturn [1913] AC 584 
 
52   [1878] 9 Ch D 68 
 
53   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(12) 
 
54   Leach, W. A., op cit,  p. 14, footnote 2 
 
55   Andreae v Selfridge & Company [1937] 3 All ER 255 
 
56   Chynoweth, P., op cit 
 
57   Leach, W. A. op cit,  p. 45 
 
58   [1913] AC 584 
 
59   [1917] 1 KB 736 
 
60   [1983] 2 EGLR 156 
 
61   [1964] 2 All ER 35 
 
62   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(12)(c) 
 
63   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 10(13) 
 
64   Party Wall etc Act 1996, s. 11 
 
65   Party Wall etc Act 1996, ss. 1(7),  2(3) to (7),  7(2), 11(6) and 11(8) 
 
66   Adams v Marylebone Borough Council [1907] 2 KB 822 
 
67   Unreported Judgement of His Honour Judge Cowell in the West London County Court, 12 May 
1997 
 
68   [1867] LR 2 QB 194 
 
69   [1866] 14 LT 55 
 
70   Leach, W. A., op cit 
 
71   Anstey, J., op cit., p. 50 
